Thursday, March 22, 2012

The Unconstitutionality of EPA Practices, Including Fines, As Well as the 1972 Clean Water Act

Watch the following video concerning the thuggery of the EPA against the Sacketts:

Now read the 8th Amendment to the Constitution:

"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

I wonder if the Clean Water Act and the EPA in general, with there huge fines, could be brought to court as unconstitutional for violating the 8th Amendment.  I would think so.  Not only are the fines represented in the Clean Water Act constitutionally suspect as "excessive," thus violating the 8th Amendment, but it looks like the EPA is allowed to fine individuals separately from the courts all by itself, without a trial, AKA due process of law.  I don't think this is right, nor constitutional.  What think yee, my readers (if there be any?)

The video makes clear that the EPA imposes excessive fines, as does the Clean Water Act.  They should have challenged both the act and the EPA fines in their case against the EPA as unconstitutional for violating the 8th Amendment.

Mind you, there are some other constitutional issues concerning the EPA brought up in the video, particularly the practice of the EPA confiscating private property via congressional acts without just compensation (let alone any compensation) and without due process of law.  Thus, it seems to me that the EPA should be brought to court for unconstitutional practices.  But, according to this video, it seems they are insisting they can't be brought to court.

Wednesday, March 14, 2012

The Constitutionality of Female Governmental officers Affirmed:

In 1845, lawyer, political philosopher, and abolitionist Lysander Spooner wrote and published “The Unconstitutionality of Slavery,” in which he asserts that the Constitution, given the wording of it and the legal meanings of the wording, do not sanction slavery, but rather the wording of the Constitution lawfully prevents slavery from happening or being lawfully practiced or present in the U.S.  Tucked away in this condemnation of slavery is another claim by Spooner, one that at his time would probably bring very little controversy, but in todays world, if made, would probably ruin one’s reputation and be near to suicide, given today’s ultra-feminist and politically correct world.  In a note in chapter VIII The Constitution of the United States, Spooner asserts that given the use of the pronouns “he” and “his” in the description of the President of the United States in Article II of the Constitution, only males may run for and be elected president.  Spooner writes, “That is, male persons. The constitution, whenever it uses the pronoun, in speaking of the President, uniformly uses the masculine gender—from which it may be inferred that male persons only were intended to be made eligible to the office.”

Spooner is a stickler for words and legal definitions of words throughout his entire argument in this work.  Indeed, Spooner says,

“It is a rule of law, in the construction of all statutes, contracts and legal instruments whatsoever—that is, those which courts design, not to invalidate, but to enforce—that where words are susceptible of two meanings, one consistent, and the other inconsistent, with liberty, justice and right, that sense is always to be adopted, which is consistent with right, unless there be something in other parts of the instrument sufficient to prove that the other is the true meaning.”

“…this rule…requires courts to give an innocent construction to all words that are susceptible of it…”

“This rule applies as well to constitutions as to contracts and statutes; for constitutions are but contracts between the people, whereby they grant authority to, and establish law for the government.”

But it in his assertion that because only the male pronoun in used in the description of the President in Article II of the Constitution, only males are constitutionally allowed to qualify for the presidency, Spooner rejects his own rule that whenever two definitions exist for a word, the one that encourages more liberty and right is the one to be accepted as the legal definition.  Indeed, Spooner assumes the pronouns “he” and “his” used in Article II to describe the president have only the meaning of the male gender.  But Spooner fails to realize that these pronouns, while having one meaning of the male gender, have another grammatical meaning and use, when used to refer to nouns that contain no gender, words like “president.”  The word “president” denotes no gender, and in fact many general nouns in English do not grammatically denote gender, but remain neuter.  And there is a grammatical rule, dating back to Spooner’s time, that when the pronoun “he” is used and its antecedent is a neuter noun, such as the word “president,” the pronoun “he” refers to mankind or persons in general, not one particular gender, in this case the male gender.  I will explain in further detail:

The definition of pronoun “he.”  Spooner is wrong in when he says only men can run for president because he fails to take his own laws regarding meanings of words to heart.  He says that if there is ever a meaning of a word favorable to liberty, then that meaning must be accepted and put to the word as the legal meaning.   Spooner fails to do this with the word “he” as used in the Constitution, particularly regarding eligibility to be the President, and even Senators.  The word “he” has the acknowledged meaning of the masculine sex, true enough.  But it also has the definition “Of things not sexually distinguished.”  And in the case of the Constitution, Article II, the antecedent of the word “he” in all cases is either the word “president” or “person,” words of no sexual distinction, and he is merely used instead of “he/she” because “he/she” was not used in that time, and “he” refers to any person who is elected to be president, whether male or female.  There is no specification as to whether the president must be male or female, for the words “president” and “person(s)” are not descriptive of a particular sex.  The words are neuter.  Thus, the pronoun “he” that refers back to “president” and “person(s)” does not refer specifically to the masculine form of the pronoun, for the antecedents are of the utmost importance, linguistically.   The masculine pronoun “his” also appears in Article II, referring to the president, but again, “his,” while masculine, has in truth a neuter meaning, for its antecedent is a neuter word, “president.”  Thus, grammatically, there is no specification as to whether the president must be male or female.  This is the intention of the ratifiers of the Constitution, “We the people,” for such a grammatical understanding of the words “he” and “his” existed in their time, they knew of it, and such is the liberal sense of the word, the one that guarantees the most liberty, right and honesty to all people, and so such is the legal meaning of the word that must be adopted by the courts, and indeed, seems to have been adopted since women have run for president and we have women representatives and senators.

This definition of the pronoun "he" comes from the Oxford English Dictionary:


2. Of things not sexually distinguished:”

Another piece of proof of this is that there is no seeming grammatical prohibition against female representatives in the Constitution in Article 1.  Never does the pronouns “he” or “his” appear.  The terms are completely neuter.  It’s silly to assert that the intention of the Constitution or of the ratifiers is to allow female representatives, but not female senators and a female president, for in the time of the ratifications, no man, let alone a woman, could have expected women governmental officers given the extremely patriarchal society of that time, and as such, it would have been silly to assert they would have allowed female representatives but not female senators and a female president.  They did not even see women as governmental officers, for politics was a man’s subject, dominated by the male.  But either way, the way the wording of the Constitution is, dictated to them and to us today that there was and still is a possibility of women governmental officers, for the grammar shows such, and the more liberal of the meanings, or rather, the meaning that promotes the most liberty, as asserted by Spooner himself, must be adopted as the legal meaning of the word.  Thus, Spooner is wrong in his interpretation of the Constitution regarding eligibility of women as Presidents.

Thus, linguistically and logically, according to the words present and lacking in the Constitution, women are fully capable of running for all governmental offices, including representatives, judges, senators, and the presidency, etc.  And the history of this country has proven this, especially as of the 20th century.  There is no natural law that prohibits women from running for governmental offices.  Any such laws that exist in the world come from the unrighteous and unlawful domination of man over women, for nature made man and woman equal before its sight in terms of their humanity, and as John Locke has said, make man and woman joint rulers or governors. So therefore, because nature has made man and woman joint governors, each capable of governing their family,  man-made governments cannot prohibit women or men from holding government office and governing their society they have chosen to live in.  Of course, to say that man and woman are equal as human beings and governors of society in the eyes of nature, does not mean they are equal in all ways and things, for they are not, not sexually, not physically, and not natural skills-wise, among other things.  Only women can bear child.  Only men can fertilize the eggs of women.  Only women have their sexual organs and features while only men have theirs.  Man is naturally stronger and rougher than women, while women are naturally weaker in strength than men and more peaceful and emotional than men.  Thus, while nature sees man and woman as equal before it’s sight as human beings with rights and as governors of the world and society, they are not completely equal in every way.

Tuesday, March 6, 2012

The Injustice in the State's Codes of Ethics Guiding Attorneys' Conduct

Today in my Legal Ethics class, we watched this video on a man named Alton Logan who was wrongfully accused and wrongfully imprisoned for 26 years for a murder he did not commit.  And the reason he stayed imprisoned was because the attorneys representing the true murderer, according to the code of ethics governing attorneys of the state they resided in, gave them attorney/client privilege.  The man these attorneys represented confessed to them that he was the one who committed the murder and not Alton Logan.  Yet according to these two attorneys, who's actions I feel are unconscionable and cannot condone, they could not leak this info or tell this info to anyone given the attorney/client privilege established in the code of ethics.  And they claim that even if they had come forward and disclosed this evidence so as to prevent Alton Logan from being wrongfully convicted and imprisoned, the evidence would not be submitted before the court because it was a breach of attorney/client privilege.  To this I believe they are wrong, for perhaps if the law enforcement and prosecution had been made known of this info and searched for evidence that the other man committed the murder instead of Alton Brown, then some valid evidence could have been found that could have cleared Mr. Logan's name.  The two attorneys claim they would have come forward with the info if Alton Logan had been sentenced to death, but since he wasn't, they decided they couldn't.  

I believe this is an instance where we have bad law to blame, not just these two attorneys and what I see to be their protection of their careers.  I believe, because of this one instance, that we need to rewrite the code of ethics for every state so that this is another exception to the code of ethics regarding attorney/client privileges.  There are already exceptions to this privilege, which privilege is often used interchangeably with the rule of confidentiality, found in Rule 1.6 of Chapter 13: Rules of Professional Conduct, under the Utah Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, found on at least in the state of Utah.

The text reads as follows:

"Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information.

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(b)(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(b)(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services;
(b)(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services;
(b)(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules;
(b)(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or
(b)(6) to comply with other law or a court order."

Thus, there are lawful exceptions to being able to disclose information that would otherwise be protected under the attorney/client privilege.  Why is the instance of an innocent person being wrongfully convicted for a crime he/she did not commit and being wrongfully incarcerated, not one of these exceptions?  IT VERY BLOODY WELL SHOULD BE!  If an attorney has a client that confesses to a crime committed, and an innocent person is being tried for the committing of that crime in his/her stead, then I believe the attorney not only should be allowed to disclose this otherwise confidential info that is the confession to the crime, but that they have a moral obligation to do so.  I even think it should be required by law that attorney's disclose such information so as to protect the innocent from false accusation, trial, conviction, and punishment. This is a case of poorly written code, and should be reversed as soon as possible so that no other innocent men or women be wrongfully accused, tried, and convicted of a crime he/she did not commit and imprisoned for that wrongful conviction.  

I hereby call on the Utah courts, given their constitutional grant to create the judicial codes and Rules of Professional Conduct, to revise this section of the Utah Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6 in particular, to include as an exception to the rule of confidentiality between an attorney and his/her client, along with the other already mentioned exceptions, the following:
"A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

-To prevent an innocent person from being wrongfully accused, tried, convicted, or punished by law, by incarceration or any other criminal or civil punishment, including fine, for a crime or civil infraction he/she did not commit."

This or something to this effect should be included, in the very least, as an exception to the rules governing attorney/client privilege, also known as the Rules of Confidentiality between attorneys and clients.  And not only should it be included as an exception, but I believe it should be a lawful requirement for attorneys to disclose such otherwise confidential information in such an incident of the innocent being wrongfully convicted and punished.


Thursday, March 1, 2012

72% of Americans Believe The Affordable Care Act's "Individual Mandate" is UNCONSTITUTIONAL!

Apparently, according to the Cato Institute, "the results of a new USA Today/Gallup poll: 72% of Americans (including 56% of Democrats and 54% of those who think “the healthcare law is a good thing”) think the individual mandate is unconstitutional.  This follows a Rasmussen poll showing that a majority of Americans favor repeal and an AP poll from August that found 82% to opine that the federal government 'should not have the power to require all Americans to buy health insurance'.”

You may view the cited article here:

What is everyone's opinion?  Constitutional?  Unconstitutional?  

I personally believe it is not only unconstitutional, but un-American to force Americans to buy a commercial product, given our revolutionary history with British mercantilism, which forced American colonists to buy only British goods while not being able to produce but certain specifically allowed goods and materials in the colonies.  American colonists were forced by law to send all their materials to England for manufacture, then to be sold to the American colonists.  In addition, Americans were prohibited from engaging in trade with other nations, specifically with tea, so as to boost up the East India Company, who harvested and sold tea as one of their main products.  Thus, smuggling became rampant in America, and many American colonists favored production of products in America and free trade, including being able to buy and sell foreign tea.

James Otis, Jr., a 1760s and 1770s Boston radical Whig and revolutionary, as well as lawyer, wrote a 1765 pamphlet entitled "Considerations on Behalf of the Colonists," in which he talked about the unfairness, inequality, and harm caused and done by the British mercantilist system.

John Dickinson, another American radical and revolutionary, as well as lawyer from Pennsylvania, from the American Revolution era wrote two letters denouncing the the 1773 Tea Act, as well as a 1765 address, titled "An Address to Friends and Countrymen on the Stamp Act" (which begins on page 197 on the hyperlink provided), which served as an inspiration for my linked article above concerning the un-American-ness of the individual mandate.